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CHOOSING, NURTURING, TRAINING AND
PLACING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW STUDENTS
Richard L. Abel*
I'd like to be good, it's true, but there's the rent to pay. And that's
not all: I sell myself for a living!
I give myself very good advice, but I very seldom follow it. 2
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers spend inordinate amounts of time debating what they ought
to do. This is not surprising. Splitting hairs is their professional disease
and normative discourse their language, and they have good reason to
be defensive. The public has never bought their "hired gun"
rationalization for amoral partisanship. Partly to distract from that
failure and partly as a substitute for constructing an effective
enforcement mechanism, lawyers endlessly revise their ethical codes,
dealing with means, not ends.'
Despite their learned incapacities, however, lawyers have no more
difficulty than others telling right from wrong. Numerous studies over
the last thirty years have found that a large proportion of students are
attracted to law by a desire to help others, improve society and redress
injustice And the standard ethical advice to young lawyers is: If you
* Connell Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Bertolt Brecht, The Good Woman of Setzuan 24 (Eric Bentley trans., 1947),
quoted in David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer Lawyers'
Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 83,118 (David Luban ed., 1983).
2. Alice, in Alice in Wonderland (Walt Disney Pictures 1951).
3. See Richard L Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L
Rev. 639,667-68 (1981).
4. E.g., Robert Granfield, Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of Law at Harvard and
Beyond 37-40 (1992); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Broken Contract: A Memoir of Harvard
Law School 5 (1992); Kenneth H. Barry & Patricia A. Connelly, Research on Law
Students: An Annotated Bibliography, 1978 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 751,753 (citing various
studies pertaining to law students); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal
Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225 (discussing the results of a study researching the emotional
well-being of law students); Howard S. Erlanger et al., Law Student Idealism and Job
Choice: Some New Data on an Old Question, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 851, 853-54 (1996);
Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School
The Law School Experience and Student Orientations to Public Interest Concerns, 13 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 11, 18-21 (1978); James C. Foster, Legal Education and the Production of
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have to ask whether it's right, it's probably wrong. For these reasons, I
am not going to try to define what it means to practice law in the public
interest. Although all of us at this conference would have different
definitions, we would probably welcome each other's characterizations
under the broad tent (although we might question the appropriation of
the concept by interests that can easily buy representation in the
market).
Instead, I am going to talk about the erosion of public interest
commitment during law school and what we as legal educators can do
about it, drawing on the experience of the first five years of the UCLA
Program in Public Interest Law and Policy ("PPILP"). There are four
challenges: choosing, nurturing, training and placing those who will
make the greatest contribution to the public interest.
I. SELECTING STUDENTS
Law schools can take various approaches to selecting students for
public interest practice. This part discusses three potential approaches.
They are: completely disregarding the issue, encouraging all students to
do public interest work, and the PPILP approach (admitting students
based on demonstrated commitment to and competence in public
interest work).
Law schools might disregard the issue entirely for two reasons. First,
they might think it is inappropriate to consider career preferences. I
disagree, however, because pretenses of neutrality allow career
preferences to be shaped powerfully by the market; and the failure of
our legal system to serve unrepresented interests works considerable
injustice. Second, law schools might believe it impossible to predict
careers. We have ample evidence, however, that background variables
(ascribed and achieved) and stated intent are significantly correlated
with future behavior.'
Some schools seek to encourage public interest commitment in all
students through voluntary or mandatory pro bono requirements. Such
Lawyers to (Re)Produce Liberal Capitalism, 9 Legal Stud. F. 179, 195 (1985); James C.
Foster, The "Cooling Out" of Law Students: Facilitating Market Cooptation of Future
Lawyers, 3 Law & Pol'y Q. 243, 245 (1981); Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig,
Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard Law School and the Social Production of Elite
Lawyers, 33 Soc. Q. 503, 516-18 (1992); Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, Pathways
into Elite Law Firms: Professional Stratification and Social Networks, 4 Res. in Pol. &
Soc'y 325, 327-28 (1992) (research study arguing that contact networks are the
distinguishing factor among top law schools); Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, The
Fate of Elite Idealism: Accommodation and Ideological Work at Harvard Law School, 39
Soc. Probs. 315,317 n.4 (1992); Audrey James Schwartz, Law, Lawyers, and Law School:
Perspectives From the First-Year Class, 30 J. Legal Educ. 437,443 (1980); Audrey James
Schwartz, The Paper Chase Myth: Law Students in the 1970s, 28 Soc. Persp. 87,91 (1985);
Robert Kerry Wilkens, "The Person You're Supposed to Become" The Politics of the
Law School Experience, 45 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 98, 104-06 (1987).
5. Joel F. Handler et al., Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights 166-70 (1978).
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programs educate students who may have been ignorant of or
insensitive to the problems of the unrepresented and express the
valuable principle, reaffirmed by the Model Rules,6 that all lawyers have
an obligation to ensure that the legal system promotes justice. We might
be able to evaluate the efficacy of those programs by comparing support
for and participation in public interest activities among graduates of
those schools and graduates of otherwise similar schools without
mandatory or voluntary pro bono programs (especially changes in
students with no prior commitment).
Some schools admit students on the basis of demonstrated public
interest commitment and competence (although always within other
constraints, typically a combination of undergraduate GPA and LSAT
scores, reinforced by competition for US News rankings). UCLA PPILP
asks students to describe (and document through references) the
content and quantity of their public interest activities (especially those
that display qualities of "tenacity, idealism and initiative that are
particularly important for public interest lawyers who may forgo
material incentives in their careers"7), special abilities (including
linguistic and cultural affinity with underserved groups), and intellectual
strengths and skills (including quantitative and qualitative methods).
We define public interest broadly as "all interests underrepresented by
the private market," including the poor, ethnic minorities, unpopular
causes "across the political spectrum,"' and diffuse interests (such as the
environment and peace).
The use of past public interest activity to predict future activity
perversely privileges those from wealthier backgrounds who can
volunteer in high school and college and take low-wage or unpaid
internships after graduation. We are beginning to test the predictive
value of these data. Even if this is validated, we are troubled by the class
bias and the tendency to exclude students of color. Because we look for
experience, our students are older. Women are over-represented in
both our applicant pool and enrollmentY These differences-class, race,
age and gender-may have independent effects on the stability of career
choice. They also may have implications for the clients our public
interest graduates serve and the ways they serve them, the public image
6. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.1 (1983) (stating that all lawyers -should
aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year").
7. See UCLA PPILP Application for Fall 2002 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
8. Id.
9. Women were eighteen of twenty-six students in the PPILP class of 2002 and
nineteen of twenty-three in the class of 2003. Other public interest programs have noted
similar gender disparities, but Kornhauser & Revesz find only a small difference, if any.
See Lewis A. Komhauser & Richard L Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal
Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L Rev. 829,936-
43 (1995).
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of public interest law, and relations among public interest law students
and lawyers.
Competitive admission to an organized public interest program has
potential advantages and disadvantages. Like the Reginald Heber
Smith fellowships for legal services lawyers in the 1970s, it makes
students feel special-a possible counterweight to the rewards of money
and prestige offered by the private sector. It may, however, simply woo
students away from other schools (depriving them of a critical mass of
public interest students) and may discourage students rejected by the
program from pursuing a public interest career. It might be possible to
compare the public interest activities of graduates from otherwise
similar schools with and without selective public interest programs.
The next part discusses sustaining public interest commitment in law
students after they have been admitted.
II. SUSTAINING COMMITMENT
Although many students are attracted to law by a desire to serve their
own conceptions of the public interest, few ultimately do so. An obvious
reason is the scarcity of public interest jobs, discussed below. Growing
awareness of that fact undoubtedly contributes to declining public
interest commitment during the three years of law school, but there are
other causes. One may be public interest-minded students' increasing
sense of isolation and alienation. These feelings may be less severe at
the few schools where public interest is the dominant ideal (a
proposition that could be tested). At other schools, public interest
students eventually find each other, but their reluctance to speak in class
(for fear of ridicule by fellow students and teachers), the division of the
first-year class into sections (with little interaction among them), the
overwhelming demands and anxieties of the first year (which discourage
volunteer activity), and the lack of contact with upper-class students all
obstruct solidarity.
By identifying and bringing public interest students together from the
outset, public interest programs may contribute to solidarity and mutual
support. (It would be possible to test this hypothesis by comparing class
participation and patterns of interaction among public interest students
at schools with and without programs.) UCLA PPILP, for instance,
gives its students a separate lawyering skills section, which offers a
"safe" place to exchange views. At the same time, because public
interest students are politically self-conscious and opinionated (and
because we tend to be most critical of those with whom we share
common ground), such concentration may intensify internal friction,
dividing the group and driving some to its margins or beyond.
Furthermore, such programs accentuate the separation of public interest
students from the rest of the class. Those students who are
uncomfortable with that heightened identification may drop out;
outsiders with public interest goals may feel denigrated and abandon
[Vol. 701566
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those aspirations.?° We could test these hypotheses by comparing
changes in public interest commitment between students inside and
outside programs and between schools with and without programs.
Robert Stover's excellent study of changes in law student aspirations
documents the ways in which those initially attracted by public interest
ends come to focus on means-lawyerly technique-forsaking public
interest as intellectually less demanding than large firm practice."
Students fear (with some justice) that overworked public interest
lawyers do a poor job of preparing new recruits. 12 By contrast, summer
clerkships in large firms may solidify the conviction that they offer better
training and superior opportunities to use hard-won legal skills.
Students and lawyers may feel more concerned (and less guilty) about
preserving and increasing their human capital than about maximizing
their income. Just as law school is a default choice for many students
primarily concerned with preserving or attaining middle class status and
comforts, so large firm associateships offer them the best chance to
continue to "keep their options open."
Public interest programs may counteract that process. Classes,
colloquia and mentoring by upper-class students, faculty, staff and
alumni can help to convince students that they can make a difference
and that the work is challenging and rewarding. Many students report
that volunteer activity, especially contact with clients and lawyers,
powerfully sustains commitment. In the intensely individualistic and
competitive law school environment, such activities allow students to
work cooperatively and associate with those in other classes (and
sometimes schools). They also foster interaction with public interest
lawyers, providing role models and images of the satisfactions of public
interest work. This is particularly important because law faculty offer
role models that are either irrelevant (few students want to teach law) or
antipathetic to public interest practice (federal clerkships and large firm
practice). Students learn from doing public interest lawyering that it
offers significant work, a reward that amply outweighs their sacrifices of
money and professional status. 3
Fifty years ago law students did not seek jobs until Christmas of their
third year and often obtained them through family contacts. 4 Now job
10. Alternatively, those students may be motivated to seek entry to the program after
their first year.
11. Robert V. Stover, Making It and Breaking It: The Fate of Public Interest
Commitment during Law School 5, 34 (1989). Charles Derber has suggested that
professionals offer less resistance to ideological proletarianization (allowing others to
determine their ends) than technical proletarianization (allowing others to determine
their means). Charles Derber, Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced
Capitalism 189-90 (1982).
12. Jack Katz, Poor People's Lawyers in Transition 109-11 (1982).
13. See id.; see also Lisa J. McIntyre, The Public Defender The Practice of Law in
the Shadows of Repute 87 (1987).
14. Erwin 0. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer Professional Organization Man? 54
(1st ed. 1964).
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anxieties pervade all three years of law school, and the selection process
relies on more impersonal factors. When public interest practice
burgeoned with the rapid expansion of federally funded legal services
and foundation-supported public interest firms in the 1970s, private
practice paid new lawyers only about fifty percent more than public
interest jobs.15 The ratio of starting salaries in elite New York law firms
and the federal government rose from three to two in 1982 to more than
five to two in 1990.16 Today the ratio can be as high as five to one and
the disparity in summer salaries even greater ($25,000 to $4000).
Because college and law school tuition have far outstripped inflation, a
larger proportion of students come from poorer backgrounds, and loans
have expanded while need-based scholarships have contracted, students
graduate with a far greater debt burden, one that increased fifty percent
in constant dollars just between 1982 and 1990.17 The combination of
these factors produces the common credo that "I'm just going to the
firm to pay off my debts." As Dr. Faustus found, however, it is hard to
escape such entanglements. Few people find it attractive, or even
possible, to take a salary cut of seventy-five percent or more in their
thirties, just when they are assuming increased financial obligations for
housing and children (or have simply become accustomed to material
comforts). Although Kornhauser and Revesz found that loan
repayment assistance programs have little or no effect on career choice,
they also hypothesized that giving students already oriented toward
public interest careers scholarships that have to be repaid only if they
abandon these careers might strengthen such commitment.'8
In any market-based society, especially ours, money tends to be the
most powerful signal of prestige. School teachers and social workers
rightly complain that their derisory salaries-far lower than those paid
for jobs requiring less training and inflicting less stress-signify
disrespect. Studies have confirmed that status within the legal
profession is inversely correlated with such variables as public service,
representation of individual clients, and litigation in lower state courts-
the core of public interest practice. 9 Highly competitive post-graduate
fellowships (Skadden, Open Society Institute, NAPIL, Echoing Green,
for example) may be a partial antidote. Law schools also might
structure loan forgiveness so that it honors public interest commitment
as well as making it economically possible.
15. Neil K. Komesar & Burton A. Weisbrod, The Public Interest Law Firm: A
Behavioral Analysis, in Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institution Analysis 80, 83
(Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978); Burton A. Weisbrod, Nonprofit and Proprietary
Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials among Lawyers, 1 J. Lab. Econ. 246,252 (1983).
16. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 9, at 889.
17. Id. at 889-90.
18. Id. at 952-54.
19. Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in
Chicago 173 (1962); John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social
Structure of the Bar 55-73 (1994).
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If we are successful at sustaining law students' commitment to public
interest work, we must adequately prepare them. The next part
addresses this preparation.
III. PREPARING FOR PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE
Most public interest programs focus on introducing students to the
world of public interest work, encouraging volunteer activities,
fundraising and selection for public interest law fellowships ("PILFs"),
and securing public interest summer clerkships and post-graduate
fellowships and jobs. With some guidance, public interest students may
choose a curriculum that helps prepare them for the distinctive demands
of public interest practice (for example, substantive courses like poverty
law, process courses like administrative law, and most clinical courses).
They also may avoid valuable courses out of ideological bias, fear of
difficulty or mistaken belief in irrelevance (e.g., corporations,
commercial law, bankruptcy, tax). Programs that believe public interest
lawyers need particular knowledge and skills can shape student
curricular choices through a cafeteria plan or required courses.
UCLA PPILP has five mandatory components: a special first-year
lawyering skills section, an ungraded first-year workshop, a second-year
problem solving class, a third-year public policy class, and an upper-class
writing requirement. The lawyering skills section is taught by an
instructor with public interest experience and utilizes public interest
cases and exercises to the extent possible; but its content is very similar
to that of the other sections. The workshop (ungraded because the first
year is so demanding) introduces students to the range of public interest
practices in the fall semester and has them do a research project on the
practices to which they aspire in the spring semester. The second-year
course uses a public interest case study to develop a variety of problem-
solving skills: the construction of social problems; the use of narrative,
rhetoric, refraining and persuasion; community organizing and direct
action; the role of the media; lobbying and legislation; litigation and
enforcement of judgments; and social movements. The third-year
course deploys a variety of public interest topics to introduce students to
microeconomics, statistical analysis, systems analysis, program
evaluation and systems design. The goal is to make them intelligent
consumers of these techniques rather than fully competent practitioners.
Although students can do independent research with any faculty
member to satisfy the upper-class writing requirement, most have taken
courses offered by PPILP faculty. We have twice taught a course on
community law practice, intended to expose students to the practicalities
of setting up their own law firms (after acquiring a grounding in some
substantive specialty), combining fee-paying clients with other public
interest activities. Additionally, I have twice taught a seminar on law
and social change in which students do a collective research project on a
major public interest campaign: first, an environmental justice struggle
2002] 1569
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over a concrete recycling plant in South Central Los Angeles, and then
an effort to pass a unique living wage ordinance in Santa Monica. Both
projects extended over at least four semesters and produced substantial
narratives (about one hundred pages each).
Law schools make no effort to validate their unique claim to prepare
students for practice. Nevertheless, it would be possible (although
difficult) to test whether graduates of public interest programs are better
equipped than others to practice public interest law. Process measures
could include evaluation by superiors, judges, adversaries, peers and
clients. I suspect it would be too difficult to control for input to be able
to use outcome variables.
Now that I have addressed preparing law students for public interest
work, I will move on to the issue of finding them jobs.
IV. PLACING PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS
Public interest programs experience some attrition in law school,
although an average of less than one student has left each PPILP
entering cohort of twenty-five. PPILP strongly encourages students to
do a public interest summer internship after their first year, requiring
them to apply for a PILF (program students are very active in raising
and disbursing money) but guaranteeing everyone funding. Virtually all
PPILP students do such summer public interest internships, more than
doubling the number who received PILFs before the creation of PPILP.
Although both PILF and PPILP summer funding are available for
second-year PPILP students, fourteen of the twenty-five worked in
firms, attracted by curiosity, salary, training and the lure of a permanent
job. We could test whether there is a correlation between first and
second summer public interest internships and later career decisions.
We also could require PPILP students to do a second summer public
interest internship (if we had the money to support them). We would
need a strong justification for doing so, however, and might drive some
of the students out of the program.
Many law schools encourage students to apply for public interest post-
graduate fellowships. We could compare their success (before and after
establishing programs, or between schools with and without them),
although it would be difficult to control for other variables. Some may
feel that competition among law schools for scarce public interest
fellowships affects only prestige. In any case, recognizing there will
never be enough public interest fellowships (or jobs after they
terminate), PPILP designed and offered a course on community law
practice to encourage students to consider creating their own self-
supporting firms and to familiarize them with the challenges they will
confront. We also are seeking funding to establish our own incubator
for community law practice, which will be a model for such firms and
train both students and recent graduates (analogous to medical
residents) in its practicalities. If, as seems likely, there are no significant
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increases in government or foundation funding, such practices represent
the only way to expand public interest opportunities for law graduates.
We envisage an office with one or two staff lawyers, engaged in both
litigation (probably anti-discrimination, funded by contingent and
statutory fees, and family or immigration law billed on a sliding scale)
and transactional work (probably community economic development).
Residents would establish their own practices, which would become
additional training sites.
CONCLUSION
The corrosive influences on the public interest commitment that
thousands of students bring to law school each year are substantial
and structural, inevitable reflections of the economic rewards and
status hierarchy of a wealthy and advanced capitalist society. Law
schools, however, can and should do much more to support students
who want to do the right thing. By learning from each other and
testing the effects of different strategies empirically, schools might
significantly increase their production of public interest lawyers.
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